This paper examines the use of switching costs by long-lived strategic buyers to manage dynamic competition between rival suppliers. The analysis reveals how buyers may employ switching costs to their advantage. We show when switching costs are high a buyer may induce suppliers to price more competitively by credibly threatening to replace the incumbent supplier with his rivals. The implication of these findings for adoption of technology and firm organization are explored in setting where buyers are integrated with their suppliers and where the buyer is an outsourcer.
Introduction
"Switching costs, lock in, tipping, penetration pricing, and compatibility" are some colorful terms that describe market competition in today's high technology economy and in some traditional manufacturing sectors. The genesis for these terms comes from the fact that purchasers may incur significant costs of switching from one good or service to another.
Real switching costs arise because (i) buyers may require training to use a new technology or good, (ii) buyers may incur set up or transactions costs to consume the new service, or (iii) buyers may lose compatibility of use with others who employ a different service. 1 A classic example occurs when a company switches from using one type of computer equipment or software to another. Changing computer service requires employees to learn new routines, to reconfigure hardware and software to be compatible, and to re establish communication networks with other users, all of which are time consuming and costly activities.
Given the prevalence and significance of switching costs in many markets, it is important to understand how they impact upon consumers' welfare and affect the behavior of producers and overall performance in these market. Beginning with Klemperer's (1987) first and fundamental analysis of switching cost economics, an important literature, summarized in Klemperer (1995) and Farrell and Klemperer (2002) , has emerged to examine these issues. Klemperer and Farrell (2002) demonstrate the intertemporal nature of price competition when there are switching costs. In the short term, buyers benefit from lower prices suppliers offer to "lockin" consumers to their product. However in the long term, once locked in, this installed base of customers are socked with higher prices reflecting the costs of switching to competing goods. This "bargain-then rip -off " pricing is not per se harmful to consumers if it only shifts the flow of consumer surplus forward in time. However, Klemperer and Farrell (2002) conclude that switching costs generally, though not always, do harm consumers by reducing price competition, deterring efficient entry, and reducing product selection and heterogeniety.
These conclusions suggest that buyers capable of affecting market outcomes would attempt to avoid switching costs whenever possible and otherwise minimize the costs and dislocation arising from switching products. Although this is an obvious matter to confirm, it is not directly addressed by the extant switching cost literature that focuses its analyses on passive individual buyers who behave as non strategic price takers. 2 In this paper we take the analysis a step further by examining the optimal response of strategic buyers to swiching costs. The procurement setting in which large power buyers are capable of affecting the terms of trade with suppliers is most appropriate for our analysis.
Specifically we envision a procurer who buys goods from competing suppliers repeatedly over time. Each time the buyer switches from one supplier to another she may incur a switching cost. These costs arise because the buyer must acquire skill at using a new supplier's product, and additionally she may lose her skill in operating the incumbent producer's product she has disgarded. This loss of skill is a cost the buyer may incur in the future if she switches back to the orginal product. We permit the buyer to respond to these switching costs in several ways. First, she may act ex ante to reduce the anticipated costs of switching.
The buyer can adopt a flexible production technoloy allowing her to change inputs at small costs, by selecting alternative suppliers who produce compatible products that are easily substituted for each other, or by training her staff to adapt to different productive inputs.
We describe these strategies in greater detail in the following sections. Second, the buyer may pursue ex post strategies to manage switching costs by conditioning purchase prices on the extent to which she becomes locked in to a certain supplier. The buyer may bargain for a price reduction from an incumbent supplier if she expects to become locked in to that producer in the future.
Our analysis reveals very different pricing strategies may arise when buyers strategically manage their procurements to control switching costs. Specifically the "bargain-followed by rip off" pricing predicted in markets with passive consumers does not materialize with multiperiod procurements. Most significantly we find the aversion of procurers to switching costs predicted by models with price-taking buyers may be reversed. Procurers may benefit when switching costs are large. This is because large buyers employ the threat of switching producers as a means to acquire lower prices from incumbent suppliers. Once an incumbent is replaced, the likelihood he will hired again to supply the procurer is reduced when switching costs are large. Therefore to avoid being replaced, the incumbent agrees to supply the buyer at lower prices.
Our analysis also predicts that integrated procurers (organizations that obtain supplies internally) and outsourcing procurers (organizations that buy supplies from outside producers) will manage switching costs differently in several respects. Whereas integrated procurers switch suppliers efficiently, since all their switching costs are internalized within the organization, outsourcer switching decisions are inefficient in various respects. We demonstrate outsourcers are likely to switch suppliers more often than is efficient. Outsourcers will invest too much in acquiring skills, but too little in retaining skill. Outsourcers will discourage standardization and compatibility of inputs, and will select an inflexible technology difficult to adapt for using different inputs. All of these inefficiencies are responses of the outsourcer to extort better terms of trade from their input suppliers.
In what follows we first present an example to motivate and illustrate our analysis in Section 2. In section 3 we introduce a model of procurement and demonstrate that an equilibrium to the procurement game for both the integrated and outsourcing procurer exists. There we also contrast our analysis with earlier related studies of procurement and switching costs. Section 4 compares how the integrated procurer and outsourcer respond to switching costs through their choice of technology and organization structure. In Section 5 we analyze the benefits of faster skill acquisition and retention for the integrated and outsourcing procurer. Section 6 compares the behavior and preferences of the integrated buyer and outsourcer when suppliers' inputs possess different degrees of compatibility. Section 7 concludes with a summary of findings and suggestions for further work
Two Examples

3
A buyer purchases exactly one unit of a product each period from one of two competing suppliers. The buyer and sellers are unable to commit to any long term agreements, so each period the procurer arranges for the purchase of the product by making a take-it-or-leave-it price offer to each seller.
The private costs of supply for each producer are independently distributed over time and across suppliers. With probability equal to 1/2 costs are either low (c L ) or they are high (c H ) for supplier i = 1, 2 in each period. Although the products are perfect substitutes, each requires the buyer to learn a different set of skills to use the product most effectively.
Whenever the buyer switches to a product he is unskilled at using, he incurs an adjustment cost in the form of a loss of surplus equal to ∆ > 0, for one period until he learns how to utilize the product. On the other hand, the buyer incurs no cost of switching if he recalls how to use the product from previous use. There is a likelihood l ∈ [0, 1] the buyer will lose his skill with a product he is not currently using. All parties discount future costs and benefits by δ ∈ [0, 1).
Example with No Switching Cost
For this exampe we assume l = 0, so a buyer's skill at using a product is permanently retained. In this case there are no switching costs over the long run. Once the buyer employs a product and acquires skill at using it he never loses that skill so switching between 3 We thank Paul Klemperer for suggesting these examples.
products causes no loss of surplus for the buyer. In this case, without the benefit of long term contracts, the best the buyer can do is to conduct an auction each period to allocate supply to the lowest cost producer. 4 A second price auction will accomplish this, and the expected acquisition price to the buyer each period will be
. Each supplier will earn an expected rent of
each period due to their private information about cost. Without the ability to commit to long term purchase agreements, there is little the procurer can do to reduce supplier rents. Threatening not to deal with a supplier in the future unless he discounts his current price is not credible for the buyer. When the future arrives, the buyer will obviously purchase from the supplier offering the lowest price. The buyer will pay out a present value sum denoted by C l=0 = c L +3c H 4(1−δ) for his lifetime product purchases.
Example with Switching Costs
In our second example we assume l = 1 so that skill loss is certain when a product is not being used. For this example (which is the one most often studied in the switching cost literature) switching costs are maximized. In the long run, the buyer is always skilled at using the incumbent supplier's product, while he is unskilled at using the product of the other supplier, who can be thought of as a potential entrant.
For this setting there are two cases to consider. The first is where ∆ < (c H − c L ). Under this condition, it is optimal for the buyer to only procure from the incumbent supplier, unless the entrant's supply costs are strictly less than the incumbent's. In this instance, switching suppliers is efficient because the supply cost savings exceeds the cost of switching
To implement this allocation the buyer specifies two prices, where p I is the price the buyer offers the incumbent for his product and p E is the price the buyer offers the entrant to supply his product. The buyer asks each producer to report their supply costs in the current period. (Recall current period costs are privately observed by each supplier)
The buyer purchases from the entrant at price p E whenever he reports a supply cost that is strictly less than the incumbent's cost. Otherwise the purchases from the incumbent at price p I .
Let S I and S E represent the expected present value of profits the incumbent and entrant producer expect to earn, respectively, given their current status under this pricing scheme. 4 If the procurer could commit to a long term agreement he could tax away all but the first period rent by requiring the two suppliers to pay him a franchise entry fee equal to their expected future profit from a series of second price auctions the buyer would conduct to determne the supplier in each future period.
It's clear that S E = 0. This is because if the buyer ever purchases from the entrant, (which occurs only when the entrant's cost is c L ) he will offer him the smallest price such that the entrant is indifferent between not producing and remaining the entrant, or producing and becoming the incumbent supplier. In either case the entrant's expected profits are driven to zero by the procurer's offer price p E which satisfies, p E − c L + δS I = δS E = 0
To calculate S I notice the buyer's optimal strategy is similarly to offer the incumbent a price p I just sufficient to induce her to supply when her cost is high at c H . That is p I −c H +δS I = δS E = 0 so that the incumbent is indifferent between supplying the product and remaining the incumbent and refusing to supply the product and becoming the entrant supplier with a future expected surplus of zero. The incumbent earns a profit only when her supply costs are low. Therefore her expected surplus is given by
after substituting for
Given that total producer profits
, the buyer's total expected acquisition costs over all periods for this case is
where the second term represents the present value minimum expected supply cost over time and the third term is the expected present value of switching costs over time. (Note switching occurs one fourth of the time when the incumbent's supply costs strictly exceeds the entrant's.)
The argument for the second case ∆ ≥ (c H − c L ) is much the same as above, but even more transparent. Here the incumbent always supplies, as the costs of switching always exceeds any cost saving from employing a lower cost producer. This implies again in equilibrium that S E = 0 as the entrant never produces. As in the previous case the buyer offers the incumbent a price p I = c H − δS I such that he is indifferent to supplying when costs are high, or refusing to supply and becoming an entrant supplier. With this offer price, the incumbent's surplus equals
the total expected acquisition costs over all periods in this case
where the second term represents the expected supply cost of the incumbent supplier who is used exclusively by the buyer. Although the costs of supply are higher with just one producer, no switching 5 This pricing scheme is both incentive compatible and individually rational for both the incumbent and entrant. For instance when the entrant's cost is c H he earns zero from truthfully reporting costs and − (c H − c L ) from reporting higher costs. Since each supplier earns non negative surplus in all states of the world, this pricing arrangement is also individually rational for each producer.
costs are incurred in this case.
Comparing the two examples reveals that switching costs have a very different effect on consumers and on supplier pricing when buyers are strategic. The most important effect is the beneficial impact switching costs have on buyer's welfare with repeat purchasing. This is manifested in the lower acquisition costs of procurers in the presence of switchig costs, (provided the discount factor is not too small) ,
Switching costs enable the procurer to commit to punishing suppliers who refuse to sell at low prices. Producers refusing to discount prices are replaced by rival suppliers, and once a seller is replaced he is less likely to be selected again to supply as the procurer must incur a cost to switch suppliers. Moreover as the example illustrates for some markets, miniscule switching costs are sufficient to endow the procurer with all the commitment power he requires.
The switching cost example also illustrates different pricing dynamics from the bargainrip off price path predicted in markets with passive buyers. In the example, equilibrium prices are stationary even when there is a switch in producers. Both incumbent and entrant are forced to maintain low prices-in the case of the incumbent to penetrate the market, and in the case of the incumbent in order to maintain his preferred status with the buyer.
Clearly the examples are special in some respects and this is the cause for some of the very sharp and dramatic effects of switching costs we observe. For example the two point distribution for supply costs in the example means that even the slightest amount of switching costs endows the procurer with significant ability to control supply prices. The stationarity of prices is also due to the two point cost distribution and the most rapid learning and forgetting of skills we assume. Nonetheless the central predictions from the examples that (1) switching costs benefit buyers by enabling them to better control supply prices, and (2) the moderation of the wide swings between promotion and rip off prices with strategic buyers continue to hold in more general settings. This is confirmed in the sections to follow where we present a general model of procurement, allowing for continuous costs distributions and different skill acquisition and retention scenarioes.
The Model
We begin with the outsourcing procurer. The outsourcer must purchase materials each period from one of two independent suppliers i = 1, 2. Each supplier i incurs privately known costs c i . These costs vary in an interval [0, c] and are assumed to be independently and identically distributed (iid) over time and across producers. For convenience we assume c i is
c . We denote the vector of supply costs by c ≡ (c 1 , c 2 ). The buyer derives value v(x i ) from consuming good x i ∈ {s, u}. For x i = s (u) the buyer is skilled (unskilled ) at employing the product The buyer derives greater value when he is skilled so that v (s) − v (u) = ∆ > 0 The differential ∆ measures the additional surplus the procurer receives when he is able to effectively use an input, perhaps a machine or piece of equipment, a type of computer software, or an information processing procedure he requires for his business.
To utilize the product effectively may require training employees, coordination of activities throughout the firm, or the acquisition of other complementary products or service used in conjunction with the input. There is considerable documentation of the importance of learning by doing as a way firms acquire skill in using products and processes. At the same time there is growing evidence that firms may also lose or forget skills when products or procedures are not used for some period of time. The process of acquiring and losing skill depending on the intensity of product use appears to be a significant source of switching cost in various manufacturing, electronic, computer equipment and software, energy and service sector markets 6 . Following this it seems reasonable to model the acquisition of skill as a stochastic learning by doing and forgetting Markov type of process that satisfies.
Assumption 1: For i, j = 1, 2 and i 6 = j,
If the buyer selects an unskilled product i to use, Φ i u,s (i) = a ∈ (0, 1] is the probability the buyer will acquire skill using the product in that period, and Φ i u,u (i) = 1 − a is the probability the product will remain unskilled. The buyer retains his skill with an input, (or we will say an input remains skilled ) provided the buyer continues to use it, so Φ i s,s (i) = 1. When the buyer is not employing a skilled input i, there is a probability Φ i s,u (j) = l ∈ [0, 1) he will lose his skill by forgetting or by losing complementary services that enhance the use of the input. An input remains unskilled while it is not being utilized, so that Φ i u,u (j) = 1. There are four possible skill states {U,
The skill state x = (x 1 , x 2 ) and the acquisition and loss probabilities a and l are public knowledge. Given x, a and l, the 4×4 Markov transition matrix P 1
with (x, x 0 ) element ρ xx 0 (1) = Pr (x 0 | x) equal to the probability of moving from state x to state x 0 upon using product 1 is
(The symmetry of suppliers implies the transition matrix
Procurement Process
A convenient way of modeling the outsourcer's acquisition of products is to assume he holds an optimal auction each period. The timing and information structure for the series of repeated auctions is:
• Each period, before meeting, seller i privately observes cost, c i .The current skill state
x is publicly observed.
• The procurer offers a trading mechanism for that period, consisting of a {λ
the buyer purchases exactly one unit of input. 8 • Given the schedule {λ o i (x, c), P o i (x, c)} each supplier decides whether to participate in the current auction. (All sellers agree to participate in equilibrium.)
• Finally, suppliers simultaneously and confidentially report their costs c i . The buyer pays the suppliers and picks one to produce. After production, the skill state, x, is updated by the Markov transition probabilities ρ xx 0 (i), whereupon the next procurement commences.
Before characterizing equilibrium let us note some important features of our analysis and how it compares to earlier studies. Our analysis is intended to capture the behavior of a large procurer, like a government procurement agency, a large corporation, or a purchasing alliance in responding to switching costs. We model the procurer as a strategic player with ability to affect prices. The buyer is unable to commit to a long term policy due to well-known political and legal constraints. 9 However the buyer does set prices each period by conducting an auction. In addition he may influence future procurements by varying switching costs through his choice of technology, firm organization and choice of suppliers.
This feature enables us to compare the role of switching costs among different procurer types including integrated buyers and outsourcers. Importantly for our purposes it also permits a comparison of the effects of switching costs where buyers are either small price-taking agents or large purchasers with market power.
Our analysis is closest to Cabral and Greenstein (1990) , Cabral and Riordan (1994) and Lewis and Yildirim (2002) . Lewis and Yildirim(2002) study optimal procurement in a model with learning by doing, similar to our model. However that paper does not consider the loss of skill from non use and how that impacts switching costs ,buyer welfare, and the design of production processes to manage switching costs, all of which are integral to our analysis. Cabral and Riordan (1994) model repeated competition among duopolists whose costs fall with cumulative production. Their analysis does not include switching costs however and it assumes buyers are short lived and non strategic. Cabral and Greenstein (1990) investigate whether procurers should commit to ignore switching costs in selecting suppliers to induce more competitive pricing. In contrast we demonstrate how optimal auctions incorporating switching costs may be designed to induce price concessions from the incumbent supplier to avoid being replaced. In this regard our model utilizes recent theories of Jehiel et al (1996 Jehiel et al ( ,1999 and Segal (1999) on competition design with externalities to characterize the optimal procurement auction. 9 It is notoriously difficult for government buyers to commit to long term procurements. Administrative rules prohibit public officials from committing future elected or appointed officials to a long term policy of procurement. Regarding private procurements, incompleteness of contracts and enforcement problems make it unlikely a buyer and seller can commit themselves to a long term supply agreement.
Assuming suppliers costs, c i 's, are iid over time and across suppliers rules out strategic learning about suppliers' costs from their current behavior. Also we assume suppliers observe the buyer's ability to utilize their inputs. 10 Thus our model abstracts from possibly interesting issues of strategic learning and signalling. 11 We do this deliberately to focus on the role of switching costs in the optimal design of procurement.
Finally we model the interaction between the buyer and two suppliers as an infinite horizon Markov game. The parties condition their strategies on the payoff relevant state of the game they individually observe each period. Below we characterize the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) for this game. 12 The focus on Markovian behavior has intuitive appeal here where we study on how the procurer's skill state affects purchases each period.
Outsourcing Procurement: Characterization of Equilibrium
and Su o 2 (x) be the expected discounted present value for the buyer and for supplier 1 and 2 respectively from participating in current and future procurements given the current state, x. In our proof of existence and uniqueness of anonymous (MPE) in Proposition 1 below, we show that these value functions exist and are well-defined. All parties discount future returns and costs by the same discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1).
Each period the buyer offers a menu{λ
with E c being the expectation operator with respect to c. Equation (IC) indicates that upon observing (x, c i ) supplier i reports his cost to the buyer to maximize the discounted expected value Su o i (x, c i ). This expected value consists 10 That suppliers observe the buyer's skill with their input seems reasonable for the settings we have in mind. Appleyard (2002) indicates suppliers often work with buyers to assist in the use of their product. Also, the buyer will often reveal his state of skill and knowledge in operating products in the course of specifying material requirements for procurement. 11 The effects of strategic learning in optimal procurement are surveyed in Laffont and Tirole (1993) . Other analysis of strategic learning in multiperiod settings include the interesting papers by Bergemann and Valimaki,(1996) , Burguet (1996) , Keller and Rady (1999) Kennan (2001) , Rustichini and Wolinski(1995) , and Taylor (2002). 12 See Maskin and Tirole (2001) for a rigorous characterization and comprehensive discussion of the properties of Markov Equilibirium..
s future expected continuation value. This continuation value is the sum of the probabilities that the skill state will transition from states x to states x 0 , ρ xx 0 (i), multiplied by seller i's expected surplus in each state,
, multiplied by the probability that each supplier i and j is selected by the procurer.
To implement a particular assignment of production requires the menu {λ o i (x, c), P o i (x, c)} offered satisfy incentive compatibility (IC), or truthful reporting of costs by each seller. To insure participation, the contract must yield supplier i expected discounted net returns at least equal to its expected return from rejecting the current contract. In the terminology of Jehiel et al(1996 Jehiel et al( , 1999 our auction is one with externalities. The identity of the winning bidder affects the welfare of other bidders and the buyer. 13 Here if seller i refuses to participate, the buyer optimally responds by purchasing the input from i 0 s rival, seller j.
Consequently participation requires for
Each seller at least receives her surplus from not currently participating in the market. Note further we are assuming that sellers remain in the market provided they expect to at least break even in future periods. 14 Combining the requirements for (IC) and (IR), we obtain the following characterization of implementable allocations.
Lemma 1. For any procurement allocation satisfying (IC) and (IR),the expected payment and surplus for seller i are given respectively by:
Proof. All proofs are contained in the Appendix. ¥
13 See Jehiel et al (1996 ,1999 for an analysis of optimal auctions and Das Varma (2002) for an analysis of standard auctions with externalities.
14 To insure each seller participates, the buyer makes the following offer. If a seller i refuses to particpate, the buyer offers to pay seller j a sufficiently high price to induce her to supply the input. Therefore it never strictly benefits seller i to refuse participation, provided (IR) is satisfied. Further it is not an equilibrium for both sellers to refuse to participate, since one of the sellers would find it optimal to deviate and agree to participate given the buyer's offer. Therefore both sellers will participate in equilibrium.
The buyer offers the sellers a menu {λ o i (x, c), P o i (x, c)} satisfying (IR) and (IC) to maximize expected surplus, B o (x), defined recursively by
+δ{ X
Substituting the Lemma 1 expression for P o i (x, c) into (3) we obtain the buyer's problem
where
is total surplus. Eq. (4) indicates the buyer selects the seller generating the greatest net surplus z i to the buyer. Net surplus consists of the current value of consumption, v (x i ) plus the expected future discounted total surplus generated with supplier i, minus production cost, c i , and seller i 0 s information rent,
Since the buyer guarantees each seller her expected surplus from not participating, one subtracts this expected surplus,
, from total surplus to obtain the buyer's expected surplus,
It is convenient to interpret the buyer's optimal purchase decision in terms of switching costs. According to eq.(4) the buyer purchases input 1 if and only if
2 ) This is equivalent to purchasing from supplier 1 if and only if
is the cost of switching when the buyer is currently purchasing from seller 1. Switching costs consists of, v (x 1 ) − v (x 2 ) the current advantage of using input 1 over input 2 and the expected loss in total future surplus δ
] from selecting seller 2 rather than 1. According to eq.(5) supplier 1 is selected if and only if the total cost (including production cost plus information rents ) of buying from supplier 1 is less than the full cost of buying from supplier 2 including the cost of switching from supplier 1 to 2. Notice we've defined switching costs in terms of the cost of switching from supplier 1 to supplier 2. Consequently the cost of switching from supplier 2 to supplier 1 is −sc o (x).
A MPE for the repeated procurement game described above is comprised of a set of best reply strategies for all players conditioned on x the skill state and on transitory costs in the case of suppliers. The buyer's strategy, {λ o 1 (x, c), λ o 2 (x, c)}, maximizes her expected surplus in (4) . Recall in deriving (4), we have already required the truthful reporting of suppliers' costs and their participation strategies to be Bayesian best responses to each other. In addition these strategies are each a best response to the buyer's contract offers for all conceivable histories of the game, summarized by the evolution of the state variable
x. In what follows we restrict attention to anonymous MPE. In such equilibria the buyer 's procurement strategy depends only on the current skill state, where states {u, s} and {s, u} are equivalent. 15 In what follows we assume, 
f (c 2 ) , otherwise producer 2 is chosen.
Integrated Procurement: Assumptions and Equilibrium Characterization
The integrated procurement setting differs from the outsourcing case only in that the sellers and buyers act cooperatively to maximize total surplus. Otherwise the assumptions governing the two settings are identical.
Let B I (x) denote the combined surplus of the integrated buyer-sellers, and denote by λ I i (x, c i ) the probability that supplier i is chosen to produce in state, x,where the superscript "I" refers to the integrated buyer-supplier case. Note buyer's surplus coincides with total surplus so B I (x) = W I (x) in this case. Proceeding as above define buyer's surplus by 15 We conjecture only anonymous MPE's exist, though we've been unable to prove this.
Comparing Buyer Responses to Switching Costs
The qualitative response of integrated buyers and outsourcers to switching costs is the same in several respects as reported in the next Proposition. 
(c) The likelihood of switching is decreasing with switching costs.
To interpret Proposition 3, recall the costs of switching from input 1 to 2 ,sc
) and a long-run cost of switching, δ
In the benchmark case typically assumed in the literature where a = l = 1 skill acquisition and loss occur within one period of switching suppliers. There is a one time cost equal to ∆ when a switch occurs.
More generally though, there is a future impact of a current supplier switch. For instance when learning a skill is rapid, and persistent so that a = 1, l < 1 part (b) of Proposition 3 implies sc k (x) < ∆ This reduction in switching costs reflects a diversification motive. By switching to the unskilled input, the buyer may eventually acquire skill with both inputs thus permitting him to select whichever input is least costly to acquire in the future. Notice however, that the future benefit to switching is never so great as to eliminate switching costs entirely. Part (a) implies there is always a positive cost to switching from a skilled to an unskilled input. In other instances when skill learning is slow and immediately forgotten so that a < 1, l = 1, part (b) implies sc k (x) > ∆. This increase over the benchmark reflects a conservation motive for the buyer, whereby he is reluctant to switch for fear of losing his expertise with the skilled input.
Part (c) of Proposition 3 shows procurers react to increasing switching costs by switching less often. Ex ante, buyers are more likely to purchase from the supplier of the skilled input.
Otherwise the suppliers provide the input with equal probability when the buyer is equally skilled at employing their products. These predictions are consistent with evidence on vendor switching in Greenstein(1995) 16 Part (b) reveals how switching costs decrease the easier it becomes to acquire skill and the less likely skill deteriorates from nonuse. Consequently, as part (c) indicates, switching from a skilled supplier is more likely the easier it is to acquire new skill and to retain old ones.
Although the integrated buyer and outsourcer responses to switching costs are qualitatively similar, they do differ quantitatively as indicated in the next Proposition.
Proposition 4
The outsourcer switches from the skilled input more frequently than is efficient.
The outsourcer is likely to switch more than the integrated buyer. This implies, as well, that switching is excessive under outsourcing, since the integrated buyer behaves efficiently. This excessive switching occurs because the outsourcer compares the total costs of procurement, including information rents, when choosing a supplier. Hence he switches to the less skilled supplier whenever
f (c 2 )´b y Proposition 1. In contrast the integrated buyer switches only when c 2 ≤ c 1 − sc I (M 1 ) by Proposition 2. Since the difference in information rents is positive whenever c 1 > c 2 the outsourcer is more likely to switch than the integrated buyer, given the same cost of switching.
This tendency towards excessive switching contrasts with other motives for switching that have been identified. For instance Taylor (2002) analyzes consumers with private costs to switching and finds that buyers may initially switch to signal they have low switching costs. This enables them to receive better terms of exchange in the future. Cabral and Greenstein (1990) find a buyer may commit to switching often by ignoring switching costs.
This forces incumbent suppliers to price more competitively.
Comparing Benefits of Faster Learning and Skill Retention
Generally one expects total surplus and buyer's surplus to increase when buyers acquire skill faster ( greater a) and retain knowledge longer (smaller l).While this always holds for the integrated buyer, surprisingly it does not for the outsourcer. To pave the way towards understanding these differences between integrated buyers and outsourcers we first characterize how surplus varies in different skill states. A second respect in which supplier surplus is nonmonotonic is suppliers' total surplus may be smaller in the complete skilled state, S than it is in the complete unskilled case, U, as indicated by part (e). This occurs when the skill loss rate is less than the learning rate.
To understand why note when suppliers are in state U, they compete to win the current supply contract to gain a skill advantage over their rival. The likelihood of moving to the differential skill state, M i conditional on winning is a, the learning rate The higher a the harder suppliers will compete to win procurement, knowing the winner is likely to gain a future advantage. Similarly, when suppliers are in state S, they compete to win the next procurement to avoid skill loss. This occurs with probability l, conditional on losing the acquisition. The higher l , the harder suppliers compete to win to avoid a future loss of skill. Since suppliers' surplus is inversely related to the degree of rivalry between them, it will be greater in state U than in state S provided a is less than l.
The rivalry between suppliers is manifested as a reduction in the price sellers offer to win the next procurement. From the expression for expected price in eq. (1) we see, conditional on winning, supplier i 0 s price reduction,
, is the present value decrease in i 0 s future surplus if he loses the current procurement. This implies in multiperiod procurements, even the incumbent-skilled supplier must continue to price competitively to avoid losing his advantage. The "bargain-followed by rip off " pricing phenomenon emphasized in the switching cost literature moderates to a great degree when there are multiple procurements. Although part (d) of Proposition 5 implies R j (M i ) ≥ R i (M i ) so that unskilled suppliers offer deeper discounts than incumbent suppliers, the difference in discounts can be small. In fact the incumbent may price just as competitively as the unskilled supplier when, for instance a = l = 1,so the incumbent cedes his advantage to the other supplier after losing just one procurement. The intensity of pricing to maintain an incumbency advantage is particularly well illustrated by the example we analyzed in section 2.
Armed with these results we're ready to understand how variations in the rate of learning, a, and the rate of skill loss, l, impact the integrated buyer and the outsourcer. In particular we consider how the long run steady state surplus of the buyer is affected. For the integrated buyer we define the long run steady state buyer's surplus B I * by
is the vector of steady state probabilities of occupying states
Proposition 6 For the integrated buyer, steady state buyer's surplus is increasing in the skill acquisition rate, a, and decreasing in the skill loss rate, l, as,
Given that switching costs significantly affect market performance, buyers have incentives to invest in procedures enabling them to manage switching costs most efficiently.
This has implications for the integrated buyer's choice of technology and firm organization.
Generally the integrated firm will benefit by adopting a flexible technology that utilizes a range of different types of inputs. For instance a power producer able to readily switch between burning natural gas or coal in its generator benefits by utilizing the currently lowest priced fuel. Manufacturing firms will benefit from installing flexible manufacturing systems (FMS's) that significantly reduce the set up costs of changing inputs and rearranging productions runs. 18 The preferences of the outsourcer for learning and skill retention are summarized in the next three propositions These propositions reference the following variables, W o * (a, l),
B o * (a, l) , and Su o * (a, l) which are respectively the steady state total surplus, buyer's surplus, and aggregate suppliers' surplus for the outsourcing case. 19 The term
refers to the size of the skill cost differential relative to the variation in random production costs.
Proposition 7 For the outsourcing equilibrium when ∆/c is small
∂B o * ∂a > 0 and
∂B o * ∂l < 0 for sc o (a, l) ∈ [0, 2c) 20 Proposition 7 shows the variation in steady state total surplus and buyer's surplus for changes in the learning rate and skill loss rate are qualitatively the same for the integrated buyer and outsourcer when the relative skill differential ∆/c is small. This occurs because switching costs are insignificant relative to the variation in random production costs c i arising between suppliers. This implies the buyer switches producers often to access the lowest cost supply source in each period. Thus any factor reducing the costs of switching, such as rapid learning and persistence of knowledge not only increases total surplus, but also benefits the outsourcer. Proposition 7 suggests that skill differentials must increase relative to production cost variation before one notices qualitatively different behavior between the outsourcer and the 17 When sc I (a, l) = c variations in a and l have no marginal affect on surplus as the behavior of the procurer is unaffected and the procurer occupies state M i for some i with probability one in equilibrium. 18 Boyer and Moreaux (1997) discuss the supply as well as strategic benefits to greater flexibility afforded firms that adopt FMSs. 19 These steady state surpluses are calculated as in equation (8) by multiplying the steady state probability of occupying a particular state by the surplus in that state and summing over all possible states. 20 When sc o (a, l) = 2c variations in a and l have no marginal affect on surplus as the behavior of the procurer is unaffected and the procurer occupies state M i for some i with probability one in equilibrium. ∂B o * ∂a > 0 whenever λ i (M i ) ≤ 1. Although it's surprising that faster learning may reduce total surplus, this readily follows as a result of the outsourcer's inefficient behavior. When the skill differential is relatively large, it is inefficient to switch from the skilled to the unskilled supplier, yet the outsourcing buyer does occasionally switch to limit the profits of the skilled supplier. This inefficient behavior increases with more rapid learning that drives down the switching cost for the outsourcer. Consequently total surplus declines with faster learning. Moreover, the buyer's surplus is increasing with faster learning, even though total surplus is declining. This is because the buyer's bargaining position visa via suppliers is enhanced. Suppliers offer greater price concessions to win the current auction, for if they lose, their opponent is more likely to acquire a skill advantage when learning is faster.
Proposition 8 shows the outsourcer may over value learning from a social perspective.
We find, ironically the outsourcer may undervalue skill persistence.
Proposition 9
In an outsourcing equilibrium, total surplus is maximized at l = 0, while buyer's surplus is maximized at l = 1 when ∆/c is large. Figure 1 for the example (a = .5, δ = .90, ∆ = c = 1, v(u) = 1) . Figure 1a shows how total surplus achieves a maximum where l = 0. From l = 0 total surplus sharply declines over a range with increases in l and then rises slightly thereafter.
Proposition 9 is illustrated in
The initial decline in total surplus arises from the direct effect of skill loss that causes the buyer to occupy lower skill states where total surplus is smaller. Eventually, though, total surplus increases as l grows because the buyer 's cost of switching rises sufficiently to cause a reduction in excess switching which increases efficiency. Figure 1b shows in contrast to total surplus, buyers' surplus reaches its maximum at l = 1. The explanation is when ∆/c is large switching arises infrequently. In the long run, most of the time the buyer occupies skill state M, where there is one skilled and one unskilled supplier. This means when l is large, the buyer can credibly threaten the skilled seller with large loses unless he offers a price concession to win the current auction. Since the incumbent supplier is likely to lose his skill advantage whenever the buyer is not employing his input he submits to the buyer's threat by lowering his price. This intuition is confirmed in Figure 1c which shows supplier surplus declining with l.
Combining the contrasting predictions of Propositions 6 and 9 suggests to us some testable predictions of how the technology and organization of integrated buyers and outsourcers should differ when skill cost differentials are large. Whereas the integrated firm will adopt a flexible technology to employ different types of inputs, the outsourcer will select dedicated production processes that must be adjusted and reconfigured to switch from one input to another. Along organization lines, the integrated firm will document best procedures for input use and will maintain in-house expertise to employ different types of operating systems, machines, and software. In contrast there will be less incentive for the outsourcer to commit to these measures for retaining operating knowledge of idle inputs.Also the integrated firm will wish to build organizational memory to recall best practice procedures for employing different types of inputs. Studies by Argote et al (1990) , Benkard (2000), Darr et al (1995) and Greenstein (1997) indicate buyers may aggressively pursue a variety of strategies including maintaining a stable work force, carefully documenting operating procedures, and adopting gateways between different operating systems in order to maintain organizational memory.
Comparing Benefits of Input Compatibility
Suppose rival suppliers may determine how compatible their inputs are with each other.
With inputs that are utilized in a similar way, the buyer's skill acquired in operating one input may transfer to the other input. That is, there might be diffusion of knowledge and skill between different inputs. Knowing this, would the integrated buyer or outsourcer require suppliers to design inputs to be compatible? Would rival suppliers voluntarily provide compatible products?
Standard theory of oligopoly with switching costs suggests buyers might benefit from purchasing compatible inputs with small switching costs. The theory further suggests that for a fixed market demand, suppliers would resist making their products more compatible to avoid directly competing with each other. 21 To examine the effects of compatibility on procurement we extend our analysis to assume inputs are compatible and there is learning diffusion. This model of diffusion builds on our previous analysis so we informally describe the model here and summarize our findings.
21 Suppliers may opt for product compatibility however, to increase the overall demand for their products.
(The formal model appears in Appendix B)
We assume procurement proceeds as before. However, now a buyer skilled with one of the inputs may also acquire skill with the other, previously unskilled input, with some probability γ ∈ (0, 1]. Further, diffusion of knowledge between inputs occurs irrespective of the input the buyer currently employs. Proceeding as before we find a unique MPE exists for the integrated buyer and the outsourcer. Further, the qualitative properties of these equilibria are the same when ∆/c is small. In particular we find as the inputs become more compatible, as measured by γ, the buyer surplus increases and procurement becomes more efficient. We summarize these findings for the outsourcer in, Proposition 10 Given Condition (A) a unique MPE exists for the outsourcer with the properties that (a)
Proposition 10 part (a) indicates switching costs are increasing and the probability of switching is decreasing in the diffusion rate. The rationale is the benefits from switching from the skilled input decline with diffusion. Continuing to use the skilled input enables the buyer to acquire skill with the other input. This opportunity may be lost if the skilled input is not used. Consequently there is less switching from the skilled input, and the buyer is more likely to acquire skill with both inputs. The procurer will transition to higher skill states with correspondingly higher total surplus as reflected by part (b) of the proposition.
The buyer will also benefit from diffusion when ∆/c is small as indicated by part (c).
Although input compatibility benefits the outsourcer when ∆c is small, this is reversed when the skill differential is large.
Proposition 11: When ∆/c is large
These findings seem counter intuitive, at least at first glance. After all with greater compatibility the skill acquired with one input is transferred with higher probability to other inputs. This means in the long run the procurer will occupy higher skill states on average which should increase his expected surplus. It would also appear suppliers with inputs that are close substitutes would compete harder, thus reducing supplier's surplus and increasing buyer's surplus.
However this reasoning overlooks the fact that buyers' bargaining power erodes as inputs become more compatible. With diffusion of knowledge between skilled and unskilled inputs, the costs of losing and the benefits of winning the next procurement are diminished for each supplier. The winning supplier acquires a smaller skill advantage as the buyer is more likely to acquire skill with the other input through diffusion. Suppliers will bid less aggressively and supply prices will rise. Further the rate of increase in supply price will be on the order of ∆ ,the skill differential, as the diffusion rate increases. This price increase will swamp whatever benefits buyers derive from being in higher skill states, when ∆ is large.
Consequently buyer surplus is reduced as inputs become closer substitutes and diffusion increases. Suppliers ,on the other hand, enjoy greater surplus. The effects of diffusion on buyer's and supplier's surplus are illustrated for the example (a = l = .5, ∆ =c = 1, v(u) = 1) in Figure 2 below.
Conclusion
Our analysis predicts that outsourcers benefit when switching costs are large by threatening to displace incumbent suppliers to induce more competitive pricing. The "bargain-followed by rip off prices" predicted by two period analyses of early models don't materialize with multiperiod procurements. And the aversion of outsourcers to switching costs predicted by models with price-taking buyers is reversed when large buyers strategically employ switching to reduce costs of procurement.
Aside from identifying how buyers react, our analysis also predicts integrated buyers and outsourcers will manage switching costs differently in several respects. We demonstrate outsourcers are likely to switch suppliers too often. Outsourcers will invest too much in acquiring skills, but too little in retaining skill. Outsourcers will discourage standardization and compatibility of inputs, and will select an inflexible technology difficult to adapt for using different inputs. All of these inefficiencies are responses of the outsourcer to extort better terms of trade from their input suppliers.
The analysis we've presented raise additional theoretical issues for consideration in future work. For one by restricting attention to Markov equilibria with payoff relevant strategies, we've abstracted from other possibly more collusion among supplier type of behavior that might arise with more general strategy spaces. Extending our model to a richer space of strategies might reveal new insights about the effects of switching costs on competition.
Regarding procurement policy, our analysis presumes the buyer implements the optimal auction each period. Although this is the buyer's preferred short term action, this policy is not necessarily optimal overall, because the buyer is unable to commit to a long term policy.
This raises the question are there other, suboptimal short term policies, that nonetheless perform better over the long term? Cabral and Greenstein (1990) suggest, for instance, a procurement policy committed to ignore switching costs may induce incumbent suppliers to price more competitively. Other recent proposals ,discussed in Kovacic and Smallwood (1994) , for reform of government procurement including dual sourcing, mandatory sharing of information between different suppliers, and multiyear procurement commitments might also be fruitfully be addressed within our model.
Another question for future research is how switching costs affect the boundaries of the firm. The seminal studies of Williamson (1975) and Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) indicate how buyers may integrate with suppliers to overcome production inefficiencies.
However despite the importance and prevalence of switching costs, organization theorists have not explicitly analyzed their impact on the boundaries of the firm. Our analysis suggests switching costs are more manageable for ongoing multiperiod procurements. Vertical integration may be most beneficial when procurements are infrequent. Other factors affecting firm boundaries will include the compatibility and complexities of the procured items, and the degree of flexibility in production.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
Employing standard techniques, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, ch. 7), one can show that incentive compatibility requires Su o i (x, c i ) to be decreasing in c i . This implies Su o i (x, c i ) is differentiable almost everywhere. Applying the Envelope Theorem to (IC) implies that
The second order condition for truth telling requires
. Using this as a boundary condition and integrating (A-1) over c i yields
Combining (A-2) and (IC), one can derive the payment function in (1). Taking expectations of both sides of (A-2) with respect to c i , yields the expression for buyer's expected surplus in (2) . ¥
Proof of Proposition 1.
To prove existence and uniqueness of an anonymous MPE requires we demonstrate there is a unique sc o (x) in each state. For the symmetric states x = S, U.
In equilibrium, adding (2) and (4) and recalling that
0, o t h e rwi s e . (A-4)
For x = S, since sc o (S) = 0 and
Similarly, for x = U, since sc o (U) = 0 and
Now consider x = M 1 and let c) and
,eq.(A-3) implies
Given F (c) = c c and (A-4), we note that E c [λ
Inserting these expected values into (A-8) and using (A-7), we find
where h(sc o ) ≡ Using the transition probabilities in Table 1 , note that
Inserting this into (A-7) and using (A-5) and (A-6) yield another equation for W o (M 1 ) :
Combining (A-9) and (A-10), sc o solves the following equation: From (7), we have
where λ Using (A-12) and (A-13), we find the following value functions for the integrated buyer:
where differentiate (A-18) with respect to l and a, respectively and find: ∂l ≥ 0. Similarly, for the outsourcing case, we differentiate (A-11) with respect to a and l, respectively, and find:
We establish in the proof of Proposition 5 below that 
∂a ≤ 0, and
Proof of Proposition 4.
Given (A-4) and (A-13), it suffices to show sc o < sc I . Note first that for any sc o ∈ [0, c],
¤ > 0. Now, suppose by way of contradiction that sc o ≥ sc I .
Since the equilibrium sc o and sc I uniquely solve eqs.(A-4) and (A-13) respectively, we have One can see that this implies sc I = c. Then, we have ∆c < h I (sc I ) = c 6 and sc I = c < ζ∆, which, in turn, implies ζ > 6, yielding a contradiction to ζ ∈ (0, 1].
This means sc I < c. Since h I (sc I ) is strictly increasing in sc I , we have ∆ < h I (sc I ) < h I (ζ∆), implying h I (ζ∆)−∆ > 0. However, using the definition of h I , we find h
Together Case 1 and Case 2 reveal B I (M) ≥ B I (U) (with > for sc I > 0). Thus,
, we follow similar steps in the proof of Proposition 3, and suppose by way of contradiction that W o (M) < W o (U). From (A-6) and (A-9), this
We analyze two cases regarding ζ and in each case we generate a contradiction by using inequalities ∆ < h(sc o ) and sc o < ζ∆.
Case 1:
One can show that for these parameter values sc o ≤ c. Since h(sc o ) is increasing in Next, for convenience, we first prove parts (d) and (e), and then part (c). We determine suppliers' expected surplus in each state by using (2) . Since the equilibrium is symmetric, w.l.o.g. we consider only supplier 1. We start with x = M 2 . Note first
From (2), we then have
Similarly, for x = U, since
To prove part (e), we use (A-20) and (A-21) to find 
For part (c), using (A-20), (A-21), and (A-22), we have
Finally, to prove part (c), we first note the following useful identity:
= 1for all a, l, δ.
Similarly,
Thus, < 0, which follows from the fact that . This means switching cost has virtually no effect on the outsourcing buyer's decision, and thus the behavior is similar to the integrated buyer's. Thus, the proof of Proposition 7 follows similar lines to that of Proposition 6. ¥
B Managing Switching Costs with Learning Diffusion
Here we sketch the formal model with learning diffusion, and in the process prove Proposition 10 and 11. In addition to the assumptions of the outsourcing model, we now assume that the buyer can transfer her skill in using one input to the unskilled one with probability γ ∈ (0, 1].
The symmetry of MPE with learning diffusion follows the similar arguments in the proof of Proposition 1. To prove the existence of a unique MPE, we first note that the equilibrium Now consider x = M 1 . From (A-7) and (A-8), we have
Together (B-1), (B-2), (B-3), and g
In addition, noting Thus, Condition A is also sufficient for uniqueness in this case, since k(γ) > 1.
From (B-6) and using properties of k(γ), one can easily see that 
